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NOTES
RANDALL v. LOFTSGAARDEN DEMISE OF THE TAX
BENEFIT DEFENSE IN TAX SHELTER SECURITIES
FRAUD LITIGATION-A RETURN TO JUDICIAL
"NEVER-NEVER LAND"'
Courts generally do not consider the impact of federal income taxes
when awarding civil damages.2 In personal injury and wrongful death
litigation, this practice is followed whether the issue involves the effect of
income taxation upon future earnings in computing damages,3 or the
admissibility of evidence regarding the tax treatment of the damage award
itself. 4 The courts defend this approach based on several public policy
arguments including: the speculative nature of an individual's future income
1. "Requiring the jury or this Court to try this case without reference to the tax
consequences of the transaction would be requiring the jury and the Court to live in an artificial
,never-never land'. . . and is tantamount to requiring this Court and the jury to try this case
blindfolded." Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
2. "[M]ost courts have refused to deduct the income tax savings from the award [for
personal injury], and likewise have refused to instruct the jury that the award is not taxable."
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.8, at 576 (1973) (citations omitted). "Most
appellate courts which have been confronted with the issue of the effect of income taxes on
awards have upheld refusals to admit evidence or to instruct the jury on~such issues." 4 M.
MINZER, C. KIMBALL & D. AXELROD, DAMAGES IN TORT AcTIONs §§ 38.31, 38-64 (1987) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter DAMAGES In TORT ACTIONS].
3. "The amount of an award of tort damages is ordinarily not diminished because of
the fact that although the award is not itself taxed, all or a part of it is to compensate for the
loss of future benefits that would have been subject to taxation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 914A(2) (1977). See, e.g., Rueter v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 731, 733 (W.D. Pa.
1982) ("Under present Pennsylvania tort law, loss of future earnings or earning power . . . is
to be awarded in full without reduction for putative income tax thereon."); Draisma v. United
States, 492 F. Supp. 1317, 1327 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (under Michigan law, damages awarded for
a decrease in earning capacity should not be reduced by the proportion the plaintiff would
normally have paid in federal, state, and local income taxes); Seely v. McEvers, 115 Ariz. 171,
174, 564 P.2d 394, 397 (1977) ("We adopt the majority rule and hold that the gross pay and
not the net or 'take home' pay is the proper basis for computing loss of future earnings, and
that the evidence of income taxes or deductions should not be allowed for the purpose of
reducing the amount of damages.").
4. "The amount of an award of tort damages is not augmented or diminished because
of the fact that the award is or is not subject to taxation." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §
914A(l) (1977). See, e.g., Anunti v. Payette, 268 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Minn. 1978) (lower court was
correct in refusing to instruct the jury in negligence action that any damages award would not
be subject to taxation); Hall v. County of New Madrid, 645 S.W.2d 149, 151-52 (Mo. App.
1982) (trial court, in personal injury action, was correct in refusing to instruct the jury that any
award made to the plaintiff would not be subject to federal or state income taxes); Salsgiver v.
E.S. Ritter Co., 42 Or. App. 547, 550, 600 P.2d 951, 952 (1979) (jury instruction that any
damages, awarded in a personal injury action, would be tax exempt is not required in cases
which do not involve federal substantive law).
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tax liability;' the allowance of discovery regarding tax matters which results
in evidence that is too complicated for the court to consider; 6 the nature
of plaintiff's tax liability which involves the plaintiff and the government
and does not concern the defendant;7 and the exemption of damage awards
from taxation which, if taken into account by the jury, might cause the
plaintiff not to realize the intended tax benefit.' Courts ignore the impact
of income taxes in commercial litigation because such damages are usually
subject to taxation and this prevents the plaintiff from receiving an un-
deserved windfall. 9 Until recently, the circuit courts of appeal have been
divided on the issue of whether rescission or rescissionary damages awarded
in an action for tax shelter10 fraud, pursuant to the federal securities laws,
5. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1960)
(larger damage award because tax consequences were ignored was likely to be offset by attorneys'
fees and the impact of inflation); Oddo v. Cardi, 100 R.I. 578, 585, 218 A.2d 373, 377 (1966)
(effect of federal income taxes on gross earnings should not be considered in computing damages
for lost wages "on the ground that the quantum of such taxation is of necessity in the realm of
conjecture").
6. See, e.g., Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 507, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1956) ("Such
subject matter would involve intricate instructions on the tax and non-tax liabilities with all the
regulations pertinent thereto. No court could, with any certainty, properly instruct a jury without
a tax expert at its side."); Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81 Wash. 2d 327, 333, 501 P.2d 1228, 1232
(1972) ("[T]o introduce an income tax matter into a lawsuit for damages would be unduly
complicating and confusing.").
7. See, e.g., Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 I11. 2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955)
("Whether the plaintiff has to pay a tax on the award is a matter that concerns only the plaintiff
and the government. The tortfeasor has no interest in such question.").
8. Section 104 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes from gross income "the amount
of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic
payments) on account of personal injury or sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1982). See Norfolk &
W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980). The Supreme Court held that evidence and jury
instructions relating to the tax free treatment of certain wrongful death awards were allowed.
The Court was concerned that a jury, in such cases, might over-compensate the plaintiff based
on the mistaken assumption that the award would be fully taxable. Id. at 496-97. For a detailed
discussion of Liepelt, see Note, Jury Review of Tax Consequences of FELA Damage A wards
Now Considered Appropriate, 26 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 409 (1980); Note, Income Taxation and the
Calculation of Tort Damage Awards: The Ramifications of Norfolk & Western Railway v.
Liepelt, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289 (1981).
9. For example, damages recovered for the loss of profits are includable in gross income
since business profits are includable in gross income. 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 6A.21 (rev. ed. 1986). Damages for the destruction of property or for an injury to
the goodwill of a business are taxable to the extent that the award exceeds the adjusted basis of
the property. Id. The IRS has asserted that damages for wrongful death are includable in gross
income where the state courts have labeled the damages as punitive in nature. Rev. Rul. 84-108,
1984-2 I.R.B. 32. However, this position has not been consistently followed by the courts. See,
e.g., Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635, 636 (N.D. Ala. 1986) ("The court is of the
opinion that Revenue Ruling 84-108 constitutes an unwarranted administrative amendment of
the clear language of the Internal Revenue Code and cannot stand."). See supra note 8 (relevant
Internal Revenue Code text).
10. "A 'tax shelter' can have various meanings and take various forms." J. FREELAND,
S. LIND & R. STmPENs, FuDAMENTALs OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 444 (5th ed. 1985). "The
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should be reduced by the amount of the tax benefits realized by the plaintiff-
investor. The Second" and Eighth Circuits 2 have held that the defendant
should be allowed to reduce his payment for damages by asserting this tax
benefit defense, while the Ninth Circuit 3 has held that such a reduction in
damages is inappropriate. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) support the latter view.' 4 A division,
however, exists in the lower courts as to both allowing" and denying 6
common characteristic of a tax shelter is the generation of tax losses which are available as
deductions under the present tax laws, not only against the income from the tax shelter, but
also against the taxpayer's income from other sources." Weisner, Tax Shelters-A Survey of
the Impact of The Tax Reform Act of 1976, 33 TAX L. REV. 5, 6-8 (1978). See generally W.
DROLLINGER, TAX SHELTERS AND TAX-FREE INCOME FOR EVERYONE (3d ed. 1977); STAFF OF JOINT
CoMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1975).
11. Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded,
106 S. Ct. 3325 (1986). Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated
and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3325 (1986). See infra notes 62-88 and accompanying text.
12. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 768 F.2d 949
(8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 379 (1985). See infra
notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
13. Western Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984); Burgess v. Premier
Corp., 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
14. Amicus curiae briefs, arguing against the tax benefit defense, were filed by the SEC
and the Department of Justice on behalf of the IRS in Salcer v. Envicon Equities, Corp., 812
F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1984). See infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text. The IRS and SEC filed
a joint amicus curiae brief in Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986). See infra notes
119-25 and accompanying text.
15. Decisions recognizing the tax benefit defense include In re Towner Petroleum, No.
MDL-607 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("It appears that the
discovery sought with respect to the plaintiff's taxes is relevant and is reasonably calculated to
lead to admissible evidence."); Herber v. Omega Oil Corp., No. 85-C-384 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4,
1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (plaintiff's "recovery in a rescissionary remedy should
probably be reduced by any 'tax shelter' or other benefit he received as a result of his
investment"); Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 916, 923 (W.D. Okla. 1985)
("It is clear that the tax advantage received by a plaintiff is an appropriate consideration in
evaluating actual damages in a tax shelter case such as this."); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437,
439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Knowledge of plaintiffs' income tax rate and the net value of their
investment, along with other information, may be needed to calculate any tax benefits which
may mitigate damages."); Bridgen v. Scott, 546 F. Supp. 1048, 1061-62 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (evidence
as to tax consequences of a speculative real estate investment was admissible).
16. Decisions rejecting the tax benefit defense include Western Fed. Corp. v. Davis, 553
F. Supp. 818, 820-21 (D. Ariz. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Western Fed. Corp. v. Erikson, 739 F.2d
1439 (9th Cir. 1984) (defendants should not be given any credit for the tax benefits received by
the plaintiffs); Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571, 586 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("The fact that
plaintiffs may be better off vis-a-vis the government does not warrant the discarding of a remedy
specifically enumerated by the Securities Act."); Rhode v. Hershberger Exploration Inc., 349 F.
Supp. 993, 994 (D. Minn. 1972) (not improper for trial court to exclude evidence relating to tax
benefits obtained by plaintiffs). See also Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 782 (3rd Cir. 1985)
(deductibility of losses not to be considered in assessing damages); Harris v. Metro. Mall, 112
Wis. 2d 487, 501-02 n.21, 334 N.W.2d 519, 526 n.21 (1983) (tax consequences of a tax shelter
do not reduce restitutionary recovery).
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the defense. 17
The tax offset issue is critical in securities litigation since it can have a
tremendous impact on the amount of damages awarded and may even
determine whether an investor decides to bring suit at all.'8 In Randall v.
Loftsgaarden,'9 the United States Supreme Court evaluated the viability of
the tax benefit defense in light of the statutory language of section 12(2)
of the Securities Act of 193320 and section 28(a) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934,21 as a well as the general policy considerations
behind the federal securities laws. 22
This Note will discuss the circuit court decisions and their divergent
positions on the tax benefit defense. The Supreme Court's holding in
17. See generally Shoptalk, 41 J. TAX'N 125 (1974); Shoptalk, 42 J. TAX'N 127 (1975)
(discussing early cases and their divergent holdings on the issue).
18. For example, the defendants' liability in Burgess was determined to be $496,000 before
the tax benefits were considered and only $157,000 after the tax offset. 727 F.2d at 838. The
defendants' liability in Austin was determined to be $294,000 before the tax benefits were
considered and only $29,000 after the offset. Brief for Petitioners at 7-8, Randall v. Loftsgaarden,
106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986) (No. 85-519) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
19. 106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986).
20. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 reads as follows:
Any person who ...
(2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means
of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
(the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him who may sue either at law or in equity-in any
court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest therein, less the amount of any income received thereon upon the tender
of such security, or damages if he no longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 77(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
21. Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reads as follows:
The rights and remedies provided by [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] shall be
in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in
equity; but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions
of [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] shall recover, through satisfaction of
judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages
on account of the act complained of.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
22. In 1933, President Roosevelt appealed to Congress and sought passage of the Securities
Act of 1933: "This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine,
'Let the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should
also give impetus to honest dealing in securities .... ." 77 CONG. REc. 937 (1933) (emphasis
added). The Preamble to the 1933 Securities Act states that its purpose is to: "Provide full and
fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof .... 47 Stat. 74 (1933) (emphasis added).
Both quotes were included in Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 32.
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Randall will then be analyzed and its potential impact evaluated. This Note
proposes that the Supreme Court misconstrued section 12(2) of the 1933
Act and section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, as well as the direct product and
collateral source rules23 when it excluded the consideration of tax benefits
when calculating damages. Such tax benefits, as well as the tax treatment
of the damage award, must be considered if the courts are to make a
realistic attempt to return the plaintiff-investor to the status quo ante which
is the measure of damages provided under the law. While it may be argued
that this form of damages is too lenient and therefore inadequately insures
the realization of the public policy goals behind the federal securities laws,
Congress, and not the courts, must provide for a harsher measure of
damages.
Finally, this Note concludes that the Randall Court's failure to address
the tax consequences of rescissionary damages has allowed confusion sur-
rounding the tax treatment of such awards to continue and Congress and
the IRS have no incentive to clarify the law.
I. BACKGROUND
During the past few years, tax shelter investments have been subjected
to tighter restrictions under the federal tax laws, 24 and have been closely
monitored by the IRS and the courts. 21 In addition, tax shelter lim-
ited partnership interests are generally treated as securities under the pro-
visions of the federal securities law 26 and are subject to regulation by the
23. See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text (discussion of direct product and
collateral source rules).
24. For example, the 1984 Tax Reform Act imposed strict requirements on promoters of
"potentially abusive tax shelters" as defined by I.R.C. § 6112(b) (Supp. 1985). Promoters who
market such tax shelters are required to register the investments with the IRS, I.R.C. § 611 l(a)(1)
(Supp. 1985), and maintain a list of clients. Id. § 6112(a). Promoters are also required to furnish
each investor who purchases such a shelter with its IRS identification number. Id. § 6111 (b)(1).
This number must be included in the investor's return. Id. § 6111(b)(2). Penalties are imposed
for failing to meet these requirements. See id. §§ 6707, 6708. Harsher penalties are imposed
under sections 1532-1534 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which amended these provisions.
25. In November 1983, the Justice Department's Tax Division created a special litigation
unit to deal with cases under the injunctive penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
which was created to stop illegal tax shelter promotions. Rollins, Patton, & Friedman, IRS Freeze
On "Abusive Tax Shelter" Refunds; How It Works and Who Will Be Affected, 34 TAX'N FOR
ACCTS. 270 (1985). See Deegan v. Comm'r, 787 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1986) (disallowed deductions
and tax credits generated by limited partnership investments in two film productions that were
not activities engaged in "for profit"). Honodel v. Comm'r, 722 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984)
(disallowed depreciation deductions for an investment in residential real estate that were computed
according to the "economic useful life" of the investment rather than the Internal Revenue Code
standards).
26. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 reads as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transfer-
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SEC. 27 Consequently, a defrauded tax shelter investor may sue for recovery
able share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or in general
any interest or participation in temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982). The definition does not mention real estate interests. However, such
interests are covered by SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4877 (Aug. 8, 1967):
Under the Federal Securities Laws, an offering of a limited partnership interests and
interests in joint or profit-sharing real estate ventures generally constitutes an offer
of a "profit sharing agreement" or "an investment contract" which is security within
the meaning of section 2(l) of the Securities Act of 1933. The Supreme Court has
said that an "investment contract" is a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits from the
efforts of the promoter and or a third party.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298, 299 (1946). In other
words, the investor provides the capital and shares the risk and the profits; the promoter or
third party manages, operates, and controls the enterprise, usually without active participation
on the part of the investor. See also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975) (defining a security as "an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others").
27. Tax shelter investments have become increasingly popular in the past few years. "In
a recent year, about two-thirds of the 15,000 private offerings made under SEC Regulation D,
17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1986) were limited partnerships and thus presumably tax shelter ventures."
SEC Directorate of Economic and Policy Analysis, An Analysis of Regulation D, at i-u (May,
1984) (cited in Brief of U.S. and SEC as Amici Curiae at 1, Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S.
Ct. 3143 (1986) (No. 85-519)) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae]. The total invested in limited
partnerships in 1984 is estimated to be $19 billion. R. HAFT & P. FAss, TAX SHELTERED
INVESTmNTS vii (3d ed. 1985). Consequently, a substantial amount of litigation has involved tax
shelters. At the present time, over 30,000 cases, 400/16 of the Tax Court's docket, involve tax
shelters. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra at 30. Most tax shelters are organized as limited partnerships
because a partnership is not taxed as a separate entity but rather its income and losses pass
through directly to the partners. P. GoLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 830-31 (2d ed. 1985).
See I.R.C. § 701 (1982).
Under I.R.C. § 465 (1982), the individual partners may deduct losses from certain partnership
activities only to the extent they are "at risk" with respect to the activity. W. McKEE, W.
NELSON & R. WHTMIrE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSFm'S AND PARTNERS V.1 § 10.11[1]
(1986). The amount "at risk" is generally composed of three components:
1. The partner's cash contributions to the partnership,
2. The adjusted basis of the other property contributed to the partnership, and
3. Amounts borrowed by the partnership for which the partner is personally liable.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-134 (1986). Real estate
activities are specifically excluded from the "at risk" provisions under I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D)
(1982). This exclusion continues under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 provided that, in the case
of nonrecourse financing, the lender is a person or business regularly engaged in the trade, or
business of lending money (i.e., is a "commercial lender"). See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 503(b)(6) (1986).
More importantly, losses from trade or business activities in which the taxpayer does not
materially participate (e.g., limited partnerships) may not offset other income such as salary,
interest, dividends and active business income. Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. No. 841, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. H7633 (Sept. 18, 1986). In the case of real estate rental activities, in which the
taxpayer does actively participate, up to $25,000 of these losses may be used to offset "non-
passive" income. Id. These provisions are effective for taxable years beginning after December
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under both section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 193328 and Rule lOb-5,
promulgated pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.29 The
Supreme Court has held that section 28(a) of the 1934 Act should be used
for guidance in determining damages under Rule 10b-5.30
The recognized standard for measuring damages under Rule lOb-5 is the
"out-of-pocket rule" by which courts award the plaintiff-investor the
difference between the purchase price of the securities and their actual
value.3 Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act 32 specifically provides for rescission
or rescissionary damages and a majority of courts have held that such
damages are also recoverable under Rule lOb-5.33 The initial contract,
therefore, is rendered void and the investor recovers his consideration
31, 1986 with a phase-in rule for investments made before the date of enactment. Id. Combined
with the reduction in individual tax rates brought in with the new Act, these provisions will
make limited partnership tax shelters a much less attractive investment in the future. Some tax
experts predict, however, that the new Act will increase the demand for "Master Limited
Partnership" interests which are publicly traded and may generate passive income that flows
through directly to the taxpayer. Daily Tax Report (BNA) No. 204, at G-6 (Oct. 22, 1986). This
income may be reduced by tax shelter losses. Id.
28. See supra note 20 (text of statute).
29. Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any facility of any national
securities exchange,
a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading,
c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
30. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (damages for violations
of Rule lOb-5 by bank employees were computed in accordance with section 28(a)); supra note
21 (text of section 28(a)).
31. See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1054 (1976); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcuRiTEs REGULATION 1133-34 (1983); D. DOBBS,
supra note 2, § 9.2, at 595. This was the method of computing damages applied by the courts
in common law fraud cases prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). L. Loss, supra
at 1133. To the extent the value of the securities is not readily determinable, reasonable inferences
may be made. Id. at 1134.
32. L. Loss, supra note 31, at 1022 ("Section 12(2) can be best analyzed and evaluated
by comparing it with common law or (equitable) rescission, from which it was adapted.");
Wigand v. Flotek, 609 F.2d 1028, 1035 (2d Cir. 1979) (under section 12(2) a plaintiff is entitled
to rescission if he still owns the stock and damages if he does not).
33. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 148-49 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (plaintiff
may choose rescission under Rule 10b-5); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978) (plaintiff may choose rescission or a money judgment tantamount to rescission). See
generally Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to
Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1984).
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which was given in exchange for the securities purchased, i.e., the parties
are returned to the status quo ante.3 4
Returning the investor in a tax shelter limited partnership to the status
quo ante upon rescission of the investment, however, is difficult because
the investor is likely to have received substantial tax benefits.35 If these tax
benefits are permanent and the investor recovers his consideration, the
investor will be placed in a better position than he was prior to the
transaction.16 If the investor's damages are reduced by the amount of tax
benefits realized and the previous benefits are completely or partially
disallowed by the IRS, the investor will be placed in a worse position than
he was prior to the transaction.
In 1964, two district court decisions, Cooper v. Hallgarten37 and Wei-
senberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co.,"8 held that tax benefits realized from
investment losses could not be used to offset the investor's subsequent
award for damages.39 In Cooper, the court reasoned that the offset should
not be allowed because any recovery by the plaintiff-investor would be
subject to taxation and the benefits previously recognized would be elim-
inated.4 0 In addition, the court noted the inequity of awarding different
amounts of damages to plaintiffs who sustained the same loss but happened
to be in different tax brackets .4 In Weisenberger, the court stated that "it
would be great 'injustice' to [the] plaintiff to reduce such damages for
34. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
"Rescission calls for cancellation of the bargain and the return of the parties to the status quo
ante; where this is impossible because of the disposal or retirement of the stock, then the
equivalent value of the stock at the time of resale ... or at the time of judgment ... should
be the proper measure of damages." Id. (citations omitted).
This measure of damages is actually composed of two steps. First, the rescission is granted
in order to void the contract. Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 1Ob-5 Cases, 65 GEo.
L.J. 1110 (1977). Then, restitution is permitted to return the property or money taken from the
plaintiff. D. Dons, supra note 2, § 4.1, at 222. See generally 3 H. BLACK, RESCISSION OF
CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF WRITEN INSTRUMENTS § 616, at 1482 (2d ed. 1929); C.
MCCORMCK, LAW OF DAMAOas § 121, at 448 (1935).
35. Note, Securities Fraud: The Tax Benefit Offset Rule of Securities Litigation, 70 MNN.
L. REV. 1185, 1190 (1986). This is particularly true with real estate tax shelters. See supra note
27 (benefits realized through investments). If the rescission occurs after the first few years of
the investment, it is likely that the total tax benefits realized by the defrauded investor will
exceed his initial consideration paid. See W. DROLLINGER, supra note 10, at 21.
36. The benefit that accrues to the investor, however, will be reduced if his damage award
is subject to taxation. See irfra notes 57-60 (discussion of tax benefit rule).
37. 34 F.R.D. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
38. 35 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
39. For a detailed analysis and critique of these two cases, see Note, Tax Consequences
of Rescission: The Interplay Between Private and Public Law, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 562, 565-70
(1975).
40. 34 F.R.D. at 486. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussion of tax
benefit rule).
41. 34 F.R.D. at 486.
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extraneous reasons wholly unconnected with the acts of [the] defendants. ' 42
Eventually, some courts did allow discovery regarding tax benefits, in
securities fraud litigation, because such information could be relevant to
issues other than damages4 3 such as valuation of the investment," misrep-
resentation of the potential tax benefits4 5 sophistication of the investors, 4 6
and reliance. 47 Finally, in the 1982 case of Austin v. Loftsgaarden/4 the
Eighth Circuit ruled that the tax benefit defense could be successfully
asserted, in an action for tax shelter fraud, to reduce the investor's award
of rescissionary damages. 49
The Austin court found that the tax savings generated by a real estate
limited partnership was a tangible economic benefit 0 and the actual dam-
ages principle of federal securities law required that a rescissionary award
for fraud "be reduced by any value received as a result of the fraudulent
transaction."51 The court found that the required calculation was no more
42. 35 F.R.D. at 558. See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text (discussion of collateral
source rule).
43. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 28.
44. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1025 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977)
(trial court properly considered tax benefits in valuing investment in closely-held corporation);
Berg v. Xerxes-Southdale Office Bldg. Co., 290 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Minn. 1980) ("On remand,
evidence will have to be received as to the market value of the limited partnership interest,
assuming the disclosure of the negative cash flow. It may well be that because of income tax
considerations, the evidence will reveal that the selling price equaled the market value of the
property.").
45. Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1062 (S.D. Tex. 1978) ("[A] plaintiff may be
questioned concerning ... tax considerations in connection with the issue of whether a misrep-
resentation actually occurred .... [A] finder of fact simply cannot understand a transaction
without a basic understanding of the tax consequences.").
46. Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("The plaintiffs' investments in
other partnerships and their investments in other tax shelters may shed light on their sophistication
as investors.").
47. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 83 F.R.D. 343, 352 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982) ("[A]n investor's 1971
tax return could reveal information relevant to the issue of reliance, since for example, an
investor in a comparatively 'low' tax bracket might not have needed the type of tax shelter the
defendant's opinion letters represented these investments to be.").
48. 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. granted
sub nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 379 (1985) [hereinafter Austin 1].
49. The plaintiffs in Austin I were investors in a real estate limited partnership explicitly
marketed as a tax shelter. 675 F.2d at 173. The promoters of the investment were found guilty
of violating Rule l0b-5 because they knowingly made material misrepresentations in the offering
memorandum. Id. at 176. In addition, the district court allowed the jury's advisory verdict which
stated that the defendant was liable under section 12(2) because he "knowingly made material
misrepresentations or omissions of which plaintiffs were unaware, and because there was some
causal connection between the Loftsgaarden's wrongful conduct and the plaintiffs' purchases."
Id. In determining the appropriate award for damages, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the tax
benefit defense should be allowed and that the plaintiffs' recovery should be reduced by the
amount of tax benefits realized. Id. at 183.
50. Id. at 180-81.
51. Id. at 181 (citing Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978)).
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uncertain or complex than that already made in determining future earn-
ings.52 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit held that evidence of any ongoing IRS
audits and expert opinion as to the likely results would be admissible at
retrial.5 3 The jury would then determine whether and to what extent the
previous deductions would be disallowed.14
Two years later, in Burgess v. Premier Corporation," the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the tax benefit defense.56 The court determined
that any previous tax savings enjoyed by tax shelter investors, who received
rescissionary damages, would be displaced by virtue of the tax benefit
rule . 7 The tax benefit rule provided that a taxpayer who claimed a deduc-
tion in one taxable year had to recognize as income any recovery or
repayment of the deduction which arose in a subsequent year.5" Since the
damages were fully taxable, the court reasoned that once the plaintiffs
52. Id. at 183 (citing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980)).
53. 675 F.2d at 183.
54. Id. The court defines a "tax shelter" as "investments which allow the investor to
offset certain 'artificial losses' (that is, non-economic losses which are available as deductions
under the present tax laws) not only against the income from those investments but also against
the [investor's] other income, usually from his regular business or professional activity." Id.
(quoting STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENuE TAXATION, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm.
Print 1975)). The Eighth Circuit limited the impact of its holding in Austin I in Hayden v.
McDonald, 742 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1984). In Hayden, the plaintiffs were investors who had
undivided working interests in oil and gas leases located in Texas. Id. at 425. Suit was brought
against the venture's promoter for rescission and restitution under the Minnesota Blue Sky Act
for falling to register the interests as securities in the state of Minnesota. Id. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 80A.23(l) (West Supp. 1984). Although the Minnesota statute used the same language
as section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the court held that tax benefits realized should
not reduce an award for rescissionary damages under the Minnesota law. Id. at 440-41. Since
Minnesota courts had not interpreted the words "income received" under the Minnesota statute,
the court deferred to the district court's interpretation that the phrase did not include tax benefits.
However, in Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Austin I], the
Eighth Circuit explicitly overruled its decision in Hayden, even though the state issue was not
presented, because the court wanted "to bring consistency" to the law. Id. at 953 n.6. For a
discussion of the Hayden case, see Note, Tax Shelter Schemes and Damages in the Eighth Circuit
- Hayden v. McDonald, 18 CaiorrroN L. REv. 1307 (1985).
55. 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 837-38. The plaintiffs in Burgess were five doctors from the Seattle, Washington
area who purchased tax shelter investments in cattle herds from Premier Corporation. Id. at
830. The promoters were found guilty of common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
violating Rule lOb-5. Id. at 831.
57. Id. at 838.
58. 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDER.A INCOM:E TAXATION § 7.34 (rev. ed. 1986). This rule
is not expressly stated in the Internal Revenue Code but is judicially created. Id. See, e.g.,
Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370 (1983) (previous tax deduction of property taxes
placed in escrow pending litigation was includable in income when the escrow amount was
refunded). The Internal Revenue Code restricted the general rule by excluding recovery of
previous deductions which did not reduce the income subject to taxation. I.R.C. § 111 (Supp.
1985). For a detailed discussion of the tax benefit rule, see Bittker and Kanner, The Tax Benefit
Rule, 26 UCLA L. REv. 265 (1978).
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paid their tax liability,59 they would be returned to the status quo ante.60
In addition, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Austin because the government would be the "banker" for the
fraudulent tax shelter activity. 6'
In Salcer v. Envicon Equities, Inc.,62 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
was also faced with the issue of whether rescission damages should be
reduced by realized tax shelter benefits. 63 Both the SEC and the IRS
submitted amicus curiae briefs which asserted that the tax benefits should
not offset an award for damages.64
The SEC's argument included three points. First, the Commission agreed
with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Burgess that the tax benefit rule would
recapture all of the previous tax benefits realized and would prevent a
windfall to the plaintiffs. 61 Second, the SEC asserted that the tax savings
59. The court found that the plaintiffs would have to file amended returns for each of
the tax years in which the tax benefits were realized. 727 F.2d at 838. Most practitioners find
this statement to be incorrect. See, e.g., Fijolek & Banoff, Do Tax Shelter Benefits Offset
Rescission Damages? The Courts Disagree, 5 REAL EsT. SEc. J. 70, 75 (1984) ("The Ninth
Circuit wrongly assumed that the "tax benefit" rule would apply to the rescission award and
would require a plaintiff to file amended tax returns for his prior tax years to remove his claimed
tax losses from the rescinded investment."). Instead, income is recognized on the plaintiff's tax
return for the year in which the damages are received. Id.
60. 727 F.2d at 838. This is the reasoning followed by the district court in Cooper v.
Halgarten in 1964. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
61. Id. The plaintiffs also argued that Burgess should be distinguished from Austin II
because the investors in Burgess were motivated primarily by their desire to purchase a valuable
investment in a cattle herd, with only secondary tax benefits. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at
31, Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984) (Nos. 82-3064 & 82-3090). The court,
however, did not address this distinction. For additional discussion of this opinion, see Note,
Securities: Tax Shelter Investment Fraud-Should Tax Savings Be Considered in Determining
Amount of Recovery?, 38 OKIA. L. Rv. 334, 341-42 (1985). The Ninth Circuit has consistently
applied its holding in Burgess to actions brought under the federal securities laws, see Western
Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984), as well as its state securities statute, see
Hall v. Johnston, 758 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Oregon's securities laws).
62. 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3324 (1986).
63. In Salcer, the plaintiffs were purchasers of fifteen partnership interests in Greenpoint
Associates, a tax shelter limited partnership established to construct, own, and operate a residential
apartment complex. 744 F.2d at 937. Suit was brought against the promoters, under Rule l0b-
5, for failing to disclose material information regarding the planned annexation of the property
by the city of Houston, an event that would cause a substantial increase in building costs. Id.
at 937-38. The defendants asserted the "tax benefit" defense but the district court refused to
allow it. Id. at 938.
64. Brief of SEC as Amicus Curiae at 2, Salcer v. Envicon Equities, Corp., 812 F.2d 713
(2d Cir. 1984) (No. 84-7183) [hereinafter Salcer SEC Brief]; Brief of United States as Amicus
Curiae at 3, Salcer v. Envicon Equities, Corp., 812 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1984) (No. 84-7183)
[hereinafter Salcer IRS Brief]. The Tax Division of the Department of Justice submitted the
brief on behalf of the United States Government.
65. Salcer SEC Brief, supra note 64, at 13. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
The defendants in Randall v. Loftsgaarden responded to this argument by asserting that if the
plaintiffs really believed they would have to pay back all of their tax benefits, it was not clear
why they were bringing suit at all. See Brief For Respondents at 20, Randall v. Loftsgaarden,
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emanated from a source collateral to the defendant. 66 Therefore, allowing
the tax benefit defense would violate the common law direct product and
collateral source rules which held that the plaintiffs could recover the full
amount of compensatory damages from a wrongdoer even if he or she
received compensation for the injury from a source entirely independent
from, or collateral to, the offending party.67 The SEC contended that the
tax benefits were conferred by the government and by other income gen-
erated by the plaintiffs and not by any action taken by the defendant. 6
Third, the SEC contended that the plaintiffs would not receive a windfall
if the government failed to recover all of the previous tax benefits realized
because some compensation should be allowed for the use of the plaintiffs'
money. 69 The SEC also argued, based on public policy, that the tax benefit
defense "would discourage private enforcement of the anti-fraud provisions
of the federal securities laws in an area in which the SEC itself was unable
to devote substantial resources. ' 70
106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents]. It should be noted that transactional
parity is usually not realized under the tax benefit rule due to changes in the taxpayer's marginal
tax rate from year to year (i.e., the tax savings on a deduction in year I may not equal the tax
liability that arises when the deduction is recaptured in year 2). See Hillsboro Natl Bank, 460
U.S. at 376 n.12.
66. Salcer SEC Brief, supra note 64, at 12.
67. DAMAOs IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 2, at 17-7. "Payments made to or benefits
conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's
liability, although they cover all or part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable."
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979). See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying
text (discussion of direct product and collateral source rules).
68. Salcer SEC Brief, supra note 64, at 11-12. "[T]he term 'tax shelter' is most frequently
used to describe a situation in which a taxpayer generates deductions in excess of income from
one activity and uses that excess to reduce income from another unrelated activity, thereby
lowering the tax on the second activity." FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra
note 10, at 445. Such write-offs are restricted under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See supra
note 27.
69. Salcer SEC Brief, supra note 64, at 15. Courts often award prejudgment interest in
securities litigation. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1981)
(prejudgment interest allowed on damages awarded under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934); Parvin v. Davis Oil Co\, 655 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1979) (prejudgment interest allowed
on California securities law violation).
70. Salcer SEC Brief, supra note 64, at 2. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77(e) (1982), requires the registration of all securities sales with the SEC. However,
section 4(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1982), exempts "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering." This exemption is not defined in the 1933 Act and the legislative
history provides little guidance. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina, Co.,
346 U.S. 119, 122 (1953). However, the courts have generally looked to four factors in determining
whether or not a sale of stock falls outside the purview of a public offering. Doran v. Petroleum
Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 899-900 (1977). These four factors are: (1) the number of
offerees and their relationship to each other and the issuer; (2) the number of units offered; (3)
the size of the offering; and (4) the manner of the offering. Id. Tax shelter limited partnership
interests are usually given exempt status from the SEC registration provisions due to this private
offering exception. See R. HAFTr & P. FAss, 1984 TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS HANDBOOK § 8
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The IRS agreed with the SEC and argued that the tax benefits previously
recognized by the plaintiffs would be recaptured. 7' If the years were still
open, i.e., still subject to assessment, the IRS could challenge the original
deductions and eliminate any tax benefits. 2 If the tax years were closed,
according to the Service, the tax benefit rule required that previous benefits
be picked up in income in the current year. a If the investor had already
sold his tax shelter interest, other tax principles might require the recog-
nition of income or other offsetting adjustments.7 4 Lastly, the IRS stated
(1983). Consequently, the SEC argued that this exempt status makes the detection of fraud in
limited partnership offerings extremely difficult and reduces the effectiveness of the Commission
in enforcing the securities laws. Salcer SEC Brief, supra note 64, at 2. Therefore, private actions
for securities laws violations are needed to supplement the enforcement activities of the SEC.
ld. (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 (1970)); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). See also Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (1979) ("The
resources of the Securities Exchange Commission are adequate to prosecute only the most flagrant
abuses. To this end, private actions brought by investors have long been viewed as a necessary
supplement to SEC enforcement actions." (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 730 (1975)), aff'd sub nom. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner 472 U.S.
299 (1985).
71. Salcer IRS Brief, note 64, at 5.
72. Id. Generally the IRS is given three years in which to assess taxpayers. I.R.C. § 6501(a)
(1982). The statute of limitations begins to run on the due date of the return or on the date the
return is actually filed, whichever is later. Id. § 6501(b). The courts have interpreted the word
"return" to mean the original return, not a subsequently filed amended return. See Zellerbach
Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934); Rev. Rul. 72-311, 1972-1 I.R.B. 398. This three
year period increases to six years if the taxpayer omits from gross income 25%'o or more of the
amount of gross income shown on the return. I.R.C. § 6501(e) (1982). There is no statute of
limitations on the assessment if the taxpayer files a false return, makes a willful attempt to evade
taxes, or files no return at all. Id. § 6501(c)(l)-(3). In addition, the IRS and the taxpayer may
extend the statute of limitations by agreement. Id. § 6501(c)(4). See generally M. GARis & S.
STRUNTZ, TAX PROCEDURE AND TAX FRAUD 164-5 (1982); F. MODRICKER, W. DONALD & J.
GIUJUM, STATUTE OF LDMTATIONS: INTEREST ON UNDERPAYMENTS AND OVERPAYMENTS OF TAX
(BNA) No. 28-4 (1984).
73. Salcer IRS Brief, supra note 64, at 6-7. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text
(discussion of tax benefit rule).
74. Salcer IRS Brief, supra note 64, at 8 (citing Western Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d
1439 (9th Cir. 1984)). The IRS gives three specific examples where the previous tax benefits may
be subject to recapture. If the partnership interest is sold subject to debt, the investor must
include the discharged indebtedness as part of the "amount realized" under I.R.C. § 1001 (1982),
thereby increasing his taxable income. Id. See I.R.C. § 752(d) (1982); Crane v. Comm'r, 331
U.S. 1 (1947) (when property encumbered by debt is sold, the amount realized includes the
discharged indebtedness); Millar v, Comm'r, 67 T.C. 656 (1977), aff'd sub nom. Millar v. C.I.R.,
577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.) (shareholders of a tax option corporation realized taxable gain in the
form of cancellation of indebtedness upon surrender of stock in the corporation), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950) (gain realized on discharge
of mortgage from a bank upon reconveyance of a deed). See generally Adams, Exploring the
Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L.
REv. 159 (1966); Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV.
277 (1978); Ginsberg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXEs 719 (1975). If accelerated depreciation
is taken on the partnership's assets, and these assets are sold or otherwise disposed of, all or
part of any recognized gain may be subject to the depreciation recapture provisions and thus
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that the tax benefits arose because Congress determined that a favorable
tax treatment should be given to encourage additional investments. 75 To
the extent a taxpayer was entitled to the tax benefits realized, "he, and
not the [defendant] should be allowed to retain those benefits because the
tax laws so provide." 7 6
The Second Circuit rejected the arguments of the SEC and the IRS and
allowed the defendant to assert the tax benefit defense. 77 The court first
noted that section 28(a) of the 1934 Act limited recovery to actual damages 78
and did not give the court discretionary power to increase that amount in
order to encourage the filing of private actions. 79 The court then rejected
the notion expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Burgess that allowing the tax
benefit defense would make the government the banker for the fraudulent
tax shelter activity. 0 The court reasoned that because the government
received the residential development, which it had hoped to encourage by
offering the tax benefits taken by the plaintiffs, it was banking precisely
what it had agreed to bank. 81
The Second Circuit rejected the IRS and SEC argument that the collateral
source doctrine prevented the consideration of tax benefits in the deter-
mination of damages.8 2 The court found the tax benefits to be an inextri-
cable part of the tax shelter offering which emanated directly from actions
by the defendant.83 The court also held that the tax benefit rule did not
apply since the plaintiffs sought rescissionary damages and not actual
rescission.84 The court then distinguished the Burgess holding. The court
stated that because the investors in Burgess had been awarded a rescission,
i.e., were returned to the status quo ante, they had recovered their previous
deductions.85 Therefore, the tax benefit rule applied.8 6 Since the plaintiffs
in Salcer, however, sought rescissionary damages, a purely monetary award,
given ordinary income treatment. Salcer IRS Brief at 8-9. The depreciation recapture provisions
of I.R.C. section 1250 (1982) generally apply to real estate. See generally FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL. INCOME TAXATION, supra note 10, at 818-32. Lastly, the IRS notes that the sale of
some partnership assets may also trigger the recapture of the investment credit. Salcer IRS Brief,
supra note 64,,at 9. See generally FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 10,
at 830-31. Both capital gains and the investment credit have been repealed under the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.
75. Salcer IRS Brief, supra note 64, at 9-10.
76. Id. at 10.
77. 744 F.2d at 939-40.
78. Id. at 940. See text of statute, supra note 21.
79. 744 F.2d at 941 (citing Alaska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975)).
80. 744 F.2d at 941. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
81. 744 F.2d at 941.
82. Id. at 941-42.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 943.
85. Id.
86. Id. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussion of tax benefit rule).
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they were not returned to the status quo ante. 7 Therefore, they did not
recover their prior deductions and the tax benefit rule did not apply."
Due to the conflict among the circuit courts, lower court decisions have
been equally divergent.8 9 When the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs'
petition for certiorari in Randall,9" it was hoped that many of the unsettled
issues would be resolved, such as whether the actual damages provisions
under federal securities laws required that damages be reduced by economic
benefits received or merely income received, whether the tax benefit rule
required recognizing as income a rescissionary damage award for recovery
from a fraudulent tax shelter scheme, 91 and whether the collateral source
or direct product doctrine should apply to such awards.
II. THE RANDALL DECISION
In 1973, the four plaintiffs, along with eighteen other investors, 92 pur-
chased interests in Motel Associates, a limited partnership organized to
construct and manage a Ramada Inn motel in Rochester, Minnesota. 93
Defendant B.J. Loftsgaarden, president and sole shareholder of defendant
Alotel, Inc., organized the venture and was to serve as a general partner
along with the corporation.
94
The original offering memorandum stated that the limited partnership
would utilize financing techniques that would generate substantial tax
benefits during the initial years of the venture and would generate profits
87. 744 F.2d at 943.
88. Id. The court responded to the third argument asserted by the SEC, regarding
prejudgment interest, by stating that the tax benefits realized by the investors were so dispro-
portionate to any computation of prejudgment interest that an argument that they should be
treated equivalently bordered on the frivolous. Id. at 942. For additional discussion of this
opinion, see Note, Tax Benefits in Mitigation of Rule l0b-5 Damages: William Z. Salcer v.
Envicon Equities Corp., 21 TULSA L.J. 542 (1986). The Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding in
Salcer in Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded,
106 S. Ct. 3324 (1986) (marketing of fraudulent coal leases as tax shelters).
89. See supra notes 15 & 16.
90. 106 S. Ct. 379 (1985).
91. Recent articles by tax practitioners recognize the uncertainty regarding the tax conse-
quences of these awards. See, e.g., Banoff, Unwinding or Rescinding A Transaction: Good Tax
Planning or Tax Fraud?, 62 TAXEs 972 (1984) ("[Tlhe tax consequences of the rescission award
for a tax shelter interest are not certain."); McCauley, Rescissionary Awards For Securities
Fraud-The Tax Benefit Defense Does Not Work, 64 TAXEs 250-51 (1986) ("It may be said that
the successful development of the tax benefit defense is attributable to the uncertainty relative
to the proper tax treatment of rescissionary awards.").
92. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 172 (8th Cir. 1982).
93. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 13.
94. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3134, 3146 (1986). Property Development and
Research Company and 2361 Building Corporation were also named as defendants. Brief for
Respondents, supra note 65, at 5 n.4. Property Development and Research Corporation was to
acquire the property for the venture while 2361 Building Corporation was to act as general
contractor for the project. Id.
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in the later years. 95 The project was to be financed through the use of a
nonrecourse note which would support the accelerated depreciation methods
that generated the partnership's tax losses. 96 Alotel Associates experienced
financial difficulties from the outset, and in February 1975, Loftsgaarden
solicited the investors to extend additional advances to the partnership. 97
The subsequent loans, however, proved insufficient. Thus, the partnership
defaulted on its obligations and the mortgage lender foreclosed on the
motel. 9
In 1976, the plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court for securities
fraud and asserted federal claims under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act,
section 10b of the 1934 Act, and SEC Rule lOb-5, as well as pendent state
law claims. 99 The jury found that Loftsgaarden had knowingly made ma-
terial misrepresentations and omissions in the offering memorandum, upon
which the investors relied, thereby causing their damages.' °° Consequently,
the defendant was liable under section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and state law.' 1'
In addition, the district court also accepted the jury's advisory verdict that
the defendant was liable under section 12( 2).102 The trial court held that
rescission was the proper award for damages under section 12(2) and
awarded the plaintiffs the amount of the consideration paid for the in-
vestment, plus prejudgment interest.'03 The court rejected Loftsgaarden's
argument that the plaintiffs' recovery should be reduced by tax benefits
realized and stated that it wanted to avoid complex tax testimony.' °4 It
dismissed the defendant's contention as "sophistic malarkey." 05
The defendant's liability under the state and federal securities laws was
affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 0 6
However, the court of appeals ruled that the lower court was incorrect in
refusing to offset the damage award by the amount of the tax benefits
realized on the plaintiffs' investment. 10 7 The Eighth Circuit found that tax
95. Austin II, 768 F.2d 949, 951 (1985). The original offering proved unsuccessful.
Consequently, Loftsgaarden revised the memorandum and proposed that the land be rented
rather than purchased since this would generate another deductible expense. 106 S. Ct. at 3147.
The plaintiffs subscribed to this revised offering with investments from $35,000 to $52,000 per
person. Id
96. 106 S. Ct. at 3147.
97. Id.
98. Id. The foreclosure proceedings can be found in United Realty Trust v. Property Dev.
& Research Co., 269 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1978).
99. 106 S. Ct. at 3147. For text of federal statutes, see supra notes 20-21, & 29.
100. 106 S. Ct. at 3147. The misstatements included mischaracterizing the financial resources
available, the terms of the land lease, and details concerning the defendants' compensation. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court ruled that rescission was allowed even though the investors had not
attempted to return their limited partnership interests until shortly before trial. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. See Austin , 675 F.2d 168, 181 (8th Cir. 1982).
106. 675 F.2d 168.
107. Id. at 183-84.
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deductions had a real economic value.' Consequently, the "strictly com-
pensatory nature" of damage awards under the securities laws required
that this value be considered in evaluating "whether and to what extent
damages were inflicted upon -[the] plaintiffs."109
The court recognized that permitting evidence regarding tax matters
would increase the complexity of trial proceedings but that such matters
were neither too complicated nor too speculative for jury consideration.1 0
To limit the impact of its decision, the court restricted its holding "only
to those cases involving investments that are expressly marketed and sold
as tax shelters.""'
On remand, the district court calculated damages in accordance with the
Eighth Circuit's holding. 1 2 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reconsidered the
case en banc." 3 The court of appeals upheld its original ruling and found
that although the "actual damages" language of section 28(a) of the 1934
Act did not appear anywhere in the 1933 Act, the courts have consistently
interpreted the provisions of the 1933 legislation as limiting recovery to
actual damages. 1 4 In addition, the court recognized that while tax benefits
realized were not "a form of income in the strict accounting sense," they
should be treated as income received under section 12(2) so that the goal
of rescission, returning the parties to the status quo ante, could be real-
ized." 5 Two judges dissented, stating that the amount of tax savings was
not income received. Rather, it represented only a tax deferral subject to
recapture at a later date." 6 The dissenters also stated that the majority's
interpretation of the statute provided "a windfall to the defendant-the
fraudulent party."" 7 The plaintiffs then appealed the court's decision."'
The SEC and the Department of Justice filed a joint amicus curiae brief,
on behalf of the IRS with the United States Supreme Court. The govern-
ment agencies again asserted the direct product or collateral source rule as
108. Id. at 182-83. "[U]nlike a corporate shareholder, ... even if the enterprise fails to
become profitable, the limited partners clearly may have something of value due to the invest-
ment's unique tax treatment." Id. at 182.
109. Id. at 183. The court referred to this notion as the "actual damages principle." Id.
at 181.
110. Id. at 183.
111. Id.
112. 106 S. Ct. at 3148. The district court computed each investor's damages as the price
paid for his investment plus simple interest less tax benefits realized. Id.
113. Austin 11, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 954. The court cited. Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1278, 1283-
86 (2d Cir. 1969) (section 28(a) applied to bar punitive damages under section 17(a) of the 1933
Act), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
115. 768 F.2d at 954-55.
116. Id. at 963 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 71-74 (IRS position that the tax
benefits would be recaptured).
117. 768 F.2d at 963.
118. The petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed on September 24, 1985, and was granted
on November 12, 1985. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 1.
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an argument against the tax benefit defense." 9 They argued that the right
to a tax deduction had no economic value "in and of itself," but was only
valuable when used to offset the investors' other income. 20 Therefore, the
tax benefits were not a direct product of the investment because, for such
benefits to be realized, they required "the intervention of an independent
transaction by the possessor." 2 '
The amici brief also asserted the position of the Burgess court that the
tax benefit rule would serve to reduce or eliminate any tax benefits realized
by the plaintiffs. 22 In addition, the government agencies argued that the
Eighth Circuit's holding was confusing because it was only limited to "tax
shelter" investments and it was difficult to determine which tax preferred
investments qualified as "shelters."' 23 Lastly, the amici brief argued that
when an action for securities fraud was brought, the investors' relevant
tax returns were often under audit so that previous tax deductions or credits
might be disallowed. 24 Therefore, determining the tax benefits retained by
the plaintiffs "will be wholly speculative, and any effort to offset the
damage award thereby will lapse into a tailspin of circular reasoning." '' 21
In an eight to one decision, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals., 26 In an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, the Court first examined the language of section 12(2) to
construe the meaning of the term income received.' 27 The Court found that
the receipt of tax deductions or credits was not taxable under the Internal
Revenue Code 2 and that such benefits could not reasonably be defined as
119. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 27, at 12-14. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying
text (SEC position regarding the collateral source rule in Salcer); infra notes 168-79 and accom-
panying text (discussion of direct product and collateral source rules).
120. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 27, at 13.
121. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF REsTITUmON § 157 comment b (1937)).
122. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 27, at 22-27. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying
text (discussion of tax benefit rule).
123. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 27, at 27-28.
124. Id. at 29.
125. Id.
126. 106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986).
127. Id. at 3150 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)). See text of section
12(2), supra note 20.
128. 106 S. Ct. at 3150 (referring to I.R.C. § 61 (1982)).
GENERAL DEFINITION - Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited
to) the following items: (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions,
fringe benefits, and similar items; (2) Gross income derived from business; (3) Gains
derived from dealings in property; (4) Interest; (5) Rents; (6) Royalties; (7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony & separate maintenance payments; (9) Annuities; (10) Income from life
insurance and endowment contracts; (11) Pensions; (12) Income from discharge of
indebtedness; (13) Distributive share of partnership gross income; (14) Income in
respect of a decedent; and (15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
I.R.C. § 61(a).
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income. 129 Therefore, the damages award should not be offset by the tax
benefits realized. 130
The Court then stated that even at common law, tax benefits would not
be considered in computing a rescissionary remedy due to the direct product
or collateral source rule.' 3 ' The Court agreed with the SEC and the IRS 132
and held that tax benefits were probably not a direct product of the security
since they were only realized if the deductions or credits generated by the
investment offset the investors' other income or their total tax liability. 33
The Court then interpreted the meaning of actual damages under section
28(a). 134 The Court examined the law at the time section 28(a) was enacted 3
and found that section 12(2) stood as "a conspicuous example of a rescis-
sionary remedy" and that such damages should not be reduced by realized
tax benefits. 36 Therefore, the Court held that section 28(a) required the
same result where rescissionary damages were obtained under section 10(b).137
The majority also stated that refusing to reduce the damage award by
the tax benefits realized prevented the unjust enrichment of the defendant,
an alternative goal of the securities laws. 38 The Court reasoned that even
if the tax benefits could be characterized as a windfall, the tax benefit rule
would probably make the recovery taxable, and would substantially reduce
the windfall. 39 The Court maintained that its holding was consistent with
the congressional intent to deter fraud and "manipulative practices in the
securities markets," and would ensure "full disclosure of information
129. 106 S. Ct. at 3150.
130. Id. The majority also rejects the defendants' contention that tax benefits constitute
consideration under section 12(2) and therefore should be used in a determination of damages
to offset the initial consideration paid by the investor. Id. at 3151-52 (citing Brief for Respondents,
supra note 65, at 29-30). The Court states that within the context of the statute, the word
"consideration" means only "the money or property given by the investor in exchange for a
the security." Id. Thus tax benefits are not included. Id.
131. 106 S. Ct. at 3151. See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text (discussion of direct
product and collateral source rules).
132. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 27, at 9-14.
133. 106 S. Ct. at 3151.
134. Id. at 3153. See supra note 21 (text of statute).
135. 106 S. Ct. at 3153 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 378 (1982)).
136. 106 S. Ct. at 3153.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965)). See infra note 194 and accompanying text; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972) ("Where the defendant received more than the seller's actual loss, . . . damages
are the amount of the defendant's profit."). See generally Thompson, supra note 33.
139. 106 S. Ct. at 3154. "We are told that the 'tax benefit rule' will apply in cases of
rescission, thus making the recovery taxable as ordinary income." Id. (citing Hillsboro Nat'l
Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370 (1983)); Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 27, at 25. The Court
went on to say that "[a]ny residual gains to plaintiffs thus emerge more as a function of the
operation of the Internal Revenue Code's complex provisions than of any unduly generous
damages standard for defrauded investors." 106 S. Ct. at 3154.
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material to investment decisions. 1 40 Permitting an offset of tax benefits
would insure that those found guilty of securities fraud would effectively
be protected from substantial liability for civil damages.' 41
The majority then concluded that section 28(a) did not require a complete
investigation of the investors' tax status to determine their damages. 142 The
Courtalso dismissed the defendant's argument that failing to recognize an
offset ignored "the economic reality of the tax benefits produced by tax
shelters.' 143 The Court stated that "[i]t is for Congress, not this Court, to
decide whether the federal securities laws should be modified to comport
with respondents' version of economic reality."' 144
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, stated that in an action
brought solely under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 it might be proper to
take tax benefits into account. 145 As stated previously, the normal measure
of damages under section 10(b) is the investor's "out-of-pocket" loss. 146
Justice Blackmun noted that an investor who received "the promised tax
benefits, but not the promised income stream or appreciation," had been
injured. 47 However, the injury did not extend to the tax benefits received
because the investor retained the benefit of his bargain. 148 Therefore, under
140. 106 S. Ct. at 3154 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151; Herman v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983)). See Preamble to the 1933 Securities Act, supra note
22.
141. 106 S. Ct. at 3154.
142. Id. "It is enough that there are formidable difficulties in predicting the ultimate
treatment of the investor's claimed tax benefits, whether or not an audit has been commenced,
and that the burden's associated with reconstruction of the investor's tax history for purposes
of calculating interest are substantial." Id.
143. Id. (citing Brief of Respondents, supra note 65, at 14). Loftsgaarden argues that the
SEC recognizes the materiality of these tax benefits in SEC Industry Guide No. 5, Preparation
of Registration Statements Relating to Interests in Real Estate Limited Partnerships, which
"requires inclusion of opinions on a variety of tax issues relating to limited partnerships, with
an emphasis on the risks that anticipated tax benefits will be lost through failure to meet formal
requirements or through economic events." Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3829, 3338-39, 3342-45
(May 24, 1982). Brief of Respondents, supra note 65, at 13 n.9.
144. 106 S. Ct at 3155.
145. The petitioners in Randall prevailed on their section 12(2) claim as well as their section
10(b) claim and could therefore select the more favorable damages remedy. Randall v. Lofts-
gaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143, 3156 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring). A plaintiff's options may be
limited, however, due to the relatively short statute of limitations period that applies to actions
brought under section 12(2). H. BLUMENTHAL, SEcusUTEs LAw HANDBOOK § 11.09, at 296 (1986).
Such actions "must be brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement, or
after it should have been discovered, but in no event after three years from the date of sale."
Id. Under Rule IOb-5, the courts look to the appropriate state statute of limitations. See Holmberg
v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (where Congress fails to provide a limitation period for
an action, the established federal policy is to follow the local statute of limitations). Therefore,
in those cases where the statute of limitations is longer and the limitation period under section
12(2) has run, the plaintiff can only seek relief under section 10(b).
146. 106 S. Ct at 3156. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussion of out-of-
pocket loss).
147. 106 S. Ct. at 3157.
148. Id.
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an out-of-pocket loss measure, the damages should not include any payment
made by the investor for these tax benefits. 149
Justice Brennan, the lone dissenter, stated that he would "look for
guidance in interpreting the word 'income' in the theory and goals of
common law rescission and equitable restitution, rather than in the Internal
Revenue Code, as the [majority] does."' 50 Brennan stated that if the
plaintiffs could recover the full consideration they gave, pursuant to the
agreement, and retain the benefits conveyed to them by the defendant,
they would be better off economically than they were before the contract
was made, contrary to the goal of restitution. 5' Justice Brennan then
concluded that the majority's interpretation of the word "income" ignored
reality because it excluded valuable tax benefits. 5 2
III. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
By failing to consider the tax aspects of the plaintiffs' tax shelter in-
vestment as well as the subsequent rescission of the agreement, the Court
in Randall takes an unrealistic approach to the determination of damages
under the federal securities laws. The Court avoids a discussion of the tax
aspects of the transaction by narrowly interpreting key terms under the
federal statutes and misapplying the collateral source and direct product
rules. Consequently, courts may now effectively award the plaintiff-investor
with a windfall unintended by the federal securities statutes. Although this
may deter fraud in the securities marketplace,5 " it is at odds with the goal
of rescission which is to return the parties to the status quo ante. If
Congress intended the deterrence of fraud to be a primary goal of the
federal securities civil liability provisions, it should have provided for a
harsher form of damages. 5
4
149. Id.
150. Id. at 3157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text
(discussion of rescission and restitution). Justice Brennan notes that income is commonly defined
as "a gain or recurrent benefit usually measured in money that derives from capital or labor,"
and that this could encompass tax savings. 106 S. Ct. at 3158-59 (citing Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 610 (1983)).
151. 106 S. Ct. at 3158.
152. Id. at 3158-59.
153. According to one Securities and Exchange Commissioner, Joseph Grundfest, deterring
fraud in the securities marketplace is the primary reason for not allowing the tax benefit defense.
In a recent address to the Southern Securities Institute in Miami entitled Should Taxpayers
Subsidize the Perfect Fraud? A Closer Look at Randall v. Loftsgaarden and the 'Tax-Offset
Rule,' Mr. Grundfest stated that the Second and Eighth Circuits have "brought the perfect fraud
closer to reality." Address by Joseph Grundfest, Sixth Annual Southern Securities Institute (Feb.
14, 1986), portions reprinted in 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 256 (1986). He stated
that "[e]ven if investors discover fraud and file an ironclad complaint, the fraudulent seller has
no reason to fear a civil damage award under the federal securities laws because he will never
be forced to disgorge the proceeds of his fraud." Id.
154. The courts have consistently held that punitive damages are not authorized under the
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In most cases, the investor's damages should not be reduced by the full
amount of the tax benefits realized due to the tax treatment of the damage
award.' However, by holding that the tax benefits received should not
even be considered in determining rescissionary damages, the Court not
only allows for an inaccurate attempt to return the investor to the status
quo ante, but provides Congress and the IRS with no incentive to end the
confusion surrounding the tax treatment of such awards.' 6
A. Income Received
The term income received is not defined in either the Securities Act of
1933 or the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.'1 7 The plaintiffs in Randall
contend that income has a "well settled" meaning, citing section 61
of the Internal Revenue Code.' 58 The Supreme Court is quick to ac-
cept this definition for income received under section 12(2) of the 1933
Act.' In the business context, however, income has many meanings.
For example, there is accrual income,'60 taxable income,' 6 ' and cash
federal securities laws. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d
Cir. 1969) (neither the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act allow punitive damages), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970). In some circumstances, however, an investor may recover punitive damages if
he combines his federal securities law claim with a common law fraud claim. See Coffee v.
Permia Corp., 474 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1973); infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussion
of punitive damages).
155. See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text. This is ironic in light of the fact that
the Supreme Court agreed to hear Randall v. Loftsgaarden because of "its importance to the
administration of the federal tax and securities laws." 106 S. Ct. at 3149.
157. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 27, at 16. "Congress did not specify, either in
the text of the statute or in its legislative history, what constitutes 'income received' . . . on a
security for purposes of section 12(2)."
158. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 18, at 17. See supra note 128 (text of I.R.C. § 61
(1982)).
159. 106 S. Ct. at 3150. "Unlike payments in cash or property received by virtue of
ownership of a security - such as distributions or dividends on stock, interest on bonds, or a
limited partner's distributive share of the partnership's capital gains or profits - the 'receipt' of
tax deductions or credits is not itself a taxable event, for the investor has received no money or
other 'income' within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code" (citing I.R.C. § 61 (1982)).
160. Under the accrual basis of accounting, "[rJevenue is recognized when it is realized
and expenses are recognized when incurred, without regard to the time of the receipt or payment."
W. Mmios, A. MOSICH & C. JOHNSON, INTERMEDIATE AccouNTINO 23 (4th ed. 1978).
161. INDIVIDUALS - For purposes of this subtitle, in the case of an individual, the term
"taxable income" means adjusted gross income (defined by I.R.C, § 62 (1982)) -
L reduced by the sum of E
a. the excess itemized exemptions, E
b. the deductions for personal deductions, provided by section 151, and
c. the direct charitable deduction, and
2. increased (in the case of an individual for whom an unused zero bracket amount
computation is provided by subsection (e)) by the unused zero bracket amount (if
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income,' 62 to name but a few.' 63 Without justification, the Supreme Court
chooses to define income as gross income under section 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code which does not include tax benefits realized.
164
The Court easily could have used net income as defined by Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 161 According to Opinion No. 11
of the Accounting Principles Board, 66 tax benefits associated with losses
are recognized currently as an increase to net income to the extent reali-
zation is assured. 67 Since a tax shelter investor recognizes a current tax
benefit (one of his primary motivations for making the investment), this
benefit could reasonably be characterized as income which is recognizable
under section 12(2).
B. The Collateral Source and Direct Product Rules
The collateral source rule attempts to maintain a balance between two
well established principles of the common law.168 First, with the exception
of punitive damages, it is generally agreed that the plaintiff should recover
no more than the actual loss he sustained. 69 Second, the defendant should
any).
I.R.C. § 63(b) (1982).
162. "Under the cash basis of accounting, revenue is recognized only when cash is received;
expenses are recorded when they are paid in cash." W. Mmos, A. MosicH & C. JOHNSON, supra
note 160, at 24.
163. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (Justice Brennan's definition of income).
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 687-88 (5th ed. 1979) (additional types of income, e.g., earned
income, imputed income, operating income, etc.).
164. 106 S. Ct. at 3150. See supra note 128 (text of I.R.C. § 61 (1982)).
165. "Although a body of generally accepted accounting principles has long been recognized
by business executives, courts, and governmental agencies, as well as by professional accountants,
no complete official list of such accounting principles exists." W. MEIGS, A. MosIcH & C.
JOHNSON supra note 160, at 12. "The most authoritative sources of generally accepted accounting
principles in recent years have been the Statements issued by the FASB (Financial Accounting
Standards Board), the Opinions issued by the APB (Accounting Principles Board), the Accounting
Research Bulletins issued by the AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants)
Committee on Accounting Procedure, and Accounting Series Releases issued by the SEC." Id.
APB Accounting Principles - Current Text §§ 1021-29 (cited in E. FARIs, AccoUTINo FOR
LAWYERS 43 (3d ed. 1975)) defines net income (net loss) as "the excess (deficit) of revenue over
expenses for an accounting period which is the net increase (net decrease) in owners' equity
(assets minus liabilities) of an enterprise for an accounting period, from profit-directed activities
that is recognized and measured in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles."
166. See supra note 165 (definition of APB).
167. "When an operating loss occurs following a period of profitable operations, a cor-
poration has a claim for a refund of past income taxes that should be recognized in the accounting
records in the year in which the loss occurs." W. Minos, A. MosIcH & C. JOHNSON, supra note
160 at 864. See generally FASB Research Report, Accounting For Income Taxes: A Review of
Alternatives 95-107 (1983).
168. DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 2, at 17-6.
169. Id. See, e.g., Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("In general
the law seeks to award compensation, and no more, for personal injuries negligently inflicted.");
1987]
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be held accountable for all the losses he has inflicted.' 70 When an inde-
pendent source of compensation for the plaintiff, such as insurance arises,
one of these principles will be violated.' 7 The court must decide whether
to ignore the independent compensation in computing the damages and
allow the plaintiff to receive more than his actual loss, or offset the damage
award by the amount of the independent compensation and hold the
defendant responsible for less than the damages he proximately caused. 72
The collateral source rule adheres to the former view because tort damages
are not reduced by collateral benefits received by the plaintiff, even if such
benefits totally eliminate the plaintiff's loss.' 73
Two rationales support the collateral source rule. 7 4 First, the defendant
should not be given the benefit of compensation which is obtained by the
plaintiff from an entirely independent source.'7 Second, the plaintiff usu-
ally contracts for the benefits (e.g., insurance) and should not be penalized
for having the foresight to protect himself against future losses.' 76 For the
doctrine to apply, it is important to note that the source of compensation
Hanna v. Martin, 49 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1950) ("The fundamental principle of the law of
damages is that the person injured by breach of contract or by wrongful or negligent act or
omission shall have fair and just compensation commensurate with the loss sustained in conse-
quence of the defendant's act which give rise to the action. In other words, the damages awarded
should be equal to and precisely commensurate with the injury sustained.").
170. "The courts were interested primarily in keeping the peace between individuals by
providing a substitute for private vengeance, and the party injured was just as likely to take the
law into his own hands when the injury was an innocent one. The man who hurt another by
pure accident or in self-defense was required to make good the damages he inflicted." W.
PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 1 (1982).
171. Other possible independent sources of compensation include unemployment benefits,
gratuities, and social legislation benefits. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American
Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. Rav. 669 (1962).
172. DAMAoES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 2, at 17-6.
173. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1478 (1966). See supra notes 66-68, 119-21, & 131-33 (discussion of the direct product and
collateral source rules).
174. Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1306 (8th Cir. 1980).
175. Id. at 1306 ("[Tjhe wrongdoer does not deserve to benefit from the fortuity that the
plaintiff has received or will receive compensation from a source wholly independent of the
wrongdoer."); Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("Usually the collateral
contribution necessarily benefits either the injured person or the wrongdoer. Whether it is a gift
or a product of the contract of employment or of insurance, the purposes of the parties to it
are obviously better served and the interests of society are likely to be better served if the injured
person is benefited than if the wrongdoer is benefited.").
176. See, e.g., Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 928 (3d Cir. 1964) ("[Olne can justify
a double recovery where the original source was supplied by the plaintiff, himself, out of
resources that would otherwise have been available to him for other purposes."); Note, Unreason
in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv. L. Rv. 741, 748-52 (1964)
(where the collateral payment is a gift, the donee should receive the intended benefit, not the
defendant; determining collateral benefits may be too speculative; legal compensation for personal
injuries does not fully compensate).
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must be collateral, i.e., secured from someone other than the defendant. 77
Otherwise, the plaintiff would receive more than his actual loss and the
defendant would be forced to pay more than the amount of the damages
he actually caused. 7 ' The equivalent concept under the law of restitution
is the direct product rule, in which the plaintiff is required to credit the
defendant with gains that are the direct product of, that is, not collateral
to, the consideration received by the plaintiff in the transaction to be
.rescinded. 179
The Supreme Court, in Randall, agreed with the SEC that the tax benefits
realized should be ignored under the direct product rule.8 0 The Court
argued that the tax benefits were not a direct product of the tax shelter
investment because they were only of value when combined with other
income or additional tax liability of-the plaintiff.18' This argument, how-
ever, ignored the fact that the tax benefits were not only a direct product
of the investment agreement, but were the primary focus of the agree-
ment.8 2 The initial tax benefits were realized due to the defendant's direct
and intentional efforts in building a motel and syndicating a limited part-
nership in accordance with the provisions of the lnternal Revenue Code.'8 3
In addition, the defendant increased the benefits by obtaining sufficient
loans to pay for the deductions taken. 8 4 These efforts were not less direct
merely because the parties assumed that the investor would generate other
income that would be sheltered by the tax losses or credits.' 5 These tax
177. See Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643, 644-45 (D.D.C. 1965) ("[The collateral source
rule] does not apply in a situation where the collateral source is the defendant himself. Under
those circumstances no one gets a windfall and if a recovery were allowed under those circum-
stances the result would be that the plaintiff would receive a double recovery and that the
defendant would be mulcted twice for the same item of damages.")
178. Id.
179. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143, 3151 (1986) (citing RESTATEMENT OF REs-
nrnMoN § 157 comment b (1937)).
180. Id. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (discussion of arguments set forth
in amici curiae brief).
181. Id. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (argument set forth by the court
regarding the direct product rule).
182. "One of the prime motivations-for investment in limited real estate partnerships is the
unique tax advantage made available to high tax bracket individuals." Salcer v. Envicon Equities,
744 F.2d 935, 940 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra note 27 (discussion of tax shelter investments).
183. Brief of Respondents, supra note 65, at 22.
184. Id. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussion of at risk provisions). The
respondents obtained these funds exclusively through their own efforts. Alotel Associates'
expenditure of these funds were three times the amount the investors advanced and resulted in
tax benefits three times greater than what would have received without the loans. Brief of
Respondents, supra note 65, at 22.
185. In an unnumbered footnote in his dissent, Justice Brennan equates a tax shelter with
a rebuilt automobile engine. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143, 3159 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). "We do not-at least I would not-describe the value that an engine has when
placed in a car as 'indirect' simply because the buyer had to acquire a car in order to exploit
that value." Id. The defendants supported their position with a different analogy. Brief for
19871
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benefits were bargained for and the benefits were as much a part of the
transaction as the expected profits.8 6 Therefore, the direct product and
collateral source rules should not exclude the tax benefits realized from
the computation of damages.
C. Actual Damages
Rather than looking to the "language of the statute itself" as the Court
did in interpreting "income" under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act,8 7 the
Randall Court examined "the state of the law at the time the legislation
was enacted" to interpret actual damages under section 28 of the 1934
Act.' This is odd because income does not have a fixed definition,8 9
whereas the courts have consistently interpreted actual damages to mean
compensatory damages or net economic loss' 90 such that punitive damages
are clearly excluded.' 9' Thus, there is an even stronger argument to examine
Respondents, supra note 65, at 24. "Suppose that Alotel Associates took the petitioners' funds
and purchased certificates of deposit from a bank. Suppose further that Alotel Associates then
distributed all those certificates to the petitioners, who promptly took them to the bank and
received payments equaling their investments. Meanwhile, their partnership interests became
worthless and they commenced an action for fraud. It would be unthinkable that they could
recover under these circumstances simply because the payments they received ultimately came
from a bank rather than Alotel Associates." Id.
186. See Note, supra note 39, at 567.
187. 106 S. Ct. at 3150. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (summary of the
Court's discussion of income received).
188. 106 S. Ct. at 3152. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (summary of the
Court's discussion of actual damages).
189. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text (discussion of income received).
190. See, e.g., Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 64 (1876) ("Compensatory damages and
actual damages mean the same thing; that is, the damages will be the result of injury alleged
and proved, and that the amount awarded will be precisely commensurate with the injury
suffered, neither more nor less, whether the injury be to the person or the estate of the complaining
party."); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[W]e believe that the purpose of
section 28(a) is to compensate civil plaintiffs for economic loss suffered as a result of wrongs
committed in violation of the 1934 Act, whether the measure of those compensatory damages
be out-of-pocket loss, the benefit of the bargain, or some other appropriate standard."); Herpich
v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970) ("The gist of the Rule lOb-5 action for damages
is economic injury to the plaintiff resulting proximately from the acts of the defendants which
constitute a violation of the rule."); Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert
denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) ("We do not believe that Congress intended the Securities and
Exchange Act to be used as a vehicle for the recovery of damages that could often be grossly
disproportionate to the harm done."). We are required to look to the courts for a definition of
"actual damages" because the legislative history of the term is of little help. See H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934) ("This subsection reserves rights and remedies existing
outside of those provided in the act, but limits the total amount recoverable to the amount of
the actual damages.").
191. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Faulkner, 550 F.2d 1303, 1313 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[section 28(a)] on
its face precludes recovery of punitive damages"); Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) ("[Plunitive damages are not authorized in private
actions under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5.").
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the language of the law under section 28(a) than there is under section
12(2).
The Court also stated that it was proper to award the plaintiffs more
than their actual loss to prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment. 19 2 This
has been a goal of the federal securities laws' 93 because any potential
windfalls should inure to the plaintiff rather than the defendant. 9 4 There-
fore, the Randall Court argued that a receipt of tax benefits by the investor,
as well as full recovery under a rescissionary measure of damages, did not
exceed the "flexible limits of section 28(a)."' 95
The Court, however, fails to recognize that the value of the tax benefits
realized by the investor are not equal to the unjust enrichment enjoyed by
the promoter. The investor generally pays a higher price for the tax shelter
investment than he does for other investments that offer comparable cash
flow and appreciation potential. 96 To the extent the tax benefits fail to
materialize or are realized by the victim and then lost, the defendant is
unjustly enriched only when he is allowed to retain the additional price or
"premium" paid for the tax shelter investment. 19 Returning this premium
to the victim remedies the unjust enrichment. Allowing a full recovery
without considering the tax benefits realized by the investor does not.
The Supreme Court also argued that the larger award for damages in a
private action served to deter prospective fraud in the securities marketplace
and insured that the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws
were met. 198 However, these purposes can be met adequately through
enforcement of the criminal sanctions available under the securities laws. 99
In addition, compensatory damages alone can have a significant deterrent
effect, especially in large class action cases. 200 Lastly, a larger federal
192. 106 S. Ct. at 3153.
193. See generally Thompson, supra note 33.
194. "It is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than
to let the fraudulent party keep them." Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1978)
(citing Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d, 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1968)).
195. 106 S. Ct. at 3153.
196. 4 R. HAir & P. FASs, TAx SHELTERED INVESTMENTS § 0.06, at 8-9 (3d ed. 1981).
197. This premium paid represents the present value of anticipated future tax savings.
Salcer SEC Brief, supra note 64, at 9 n. 12.
198. 106 S. Ct. at 3154. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
199. The criminal sanctions can be found in section 24 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x
(1982) and section 32 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C § 78ff (Supp. 1985).
200. See, e.g., DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum, Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970)
("Since [class actions and derivative actions] allow many small claims to be litigated in the same
action, the overall size of the compensatory damages alone may constitute a significant deter-
rent."); Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969)
("[Class actions, derivative suits and other such procedural devices provide sufficient incentive
to insure that those injured by a violation of lOb-5 will have adequate opportunity to confront
alleged malefactors and to have appropriate sanctions imposed upon them."). There also exists
"the psychological deterrent of being branded a knowing violator of the law." Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). See
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damage award combined with pendent state claims, which allow punitive
damages, may provide the plaintiff with a double recovery.20'
Section 28(a) requires that the investor be awarded no more than his
actual damages and section 12(2) requires that damages be reduced by
income received.2 0 If Congress intended a stronger deterrent, it could have
provided for an express measure of punitive damages203 instead of allowing
recovery only for an out-of-pocket loss or rescission. 20 4 Because such
expansive language is not explicitly provided by the legislature, it is not
proper for the courts to provide such expansive meaning to the language.
IV. TAX TREATMENT OF DAMAGES
By holding that tax benefits are to be ignored in computing rescissionary
damages in securities fraud litigation, the Randall Court does not attempt
to clarify the proper tax treatment of such awards. 205 The Court merely
mentions the tax benefit rule206 and states that there are too many difficulties
in predicting the ultimate treatment of the investor's claimed tax benefits. 207
However, if an accurate measure of damages is to be made, so that the
parties are returned to the status quo ante, the tax implications of the
transaction cannot be ignored. 28
Tax benefits have real economic value and in some cases are readily
transferable to other parties under the Internal Revenue Code. 209 To the
generally Hirsch & Lewis, Punitive Damage Awards Under the Federal Securities Acts, 47 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 72 (1971).
201. "The statutory language suggests that one purpose of section 28(a) is to prevent double
recovery by those who assert both state and federal claims arising out of the same conduct."
Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing 3 L. Loss, SEcUTIas REGULATION
1624 n.5 (2d ed. 1961)).
202. See supra notes 20-21 (text of statutes).
203. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) (provides for treble damages).
204. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussion of out-of-pocket loss).
205. The Court's statements, if anything, only added to the confusion regarding this
question. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
206. 106 S. Ct. at 3154.
207. Id. However, many tax experts believe that a reasonable estimate of the tax benefits
can be made. See, e.g., Banoff, Supreme Court Holds Tax Shelter Benefits Do Not Offset
Rescission Damages, 64 J. TAX'N 210, 213 (1986) (in his discussion of the computation of
damages for tax shelter fraud, the author says that "[d]espite [the existing] uncertainties and
complexities, it usually will be possible to reach an approximate determination of the net tax
benefits to the plaintiffs.").
208. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
209. One example is the safe harbor leasing provisions enacted under the Economic Recovery
Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34 (1981). Using these rules, "three party financing leases or leverage
leases are often used to transfer tax benefits from users of property who do not have sufficient
tax liability to absorb those benefits." 5 J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INcoua TAXATION §
23.65 (rev. ed. 1986). "Since Congress recognized that many businesses would not be able to
completely use the increased cost recovery allowances under ACRS (Accelerated Cost Recovery
System), it decided to facilitate the transfer of ACRS benefits through these types of transactions."
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extent tax benefits promised to an investor fail to materialize, full recovery
is allowed in court. 210 The SEC has also recognized the importance of these
benefits in real estate limited partnerships because it requires the offerer
to disclose information regarding potential tax write-offs that might be
generated by the investment. 21
In some cases, such as when the investor's tax returns are subject to
audit, i.e., the statute of limitations on assessments has not run,2 1 2 the
evidence concerning tax benefits "may be so speculative as to be beyond.
the jury's province. ' 21 3 If evidence as to tax benefits is allowed, the plaintiff
would be forced to argue in court that the tax benefits will be recaptured
while arguing before the IRS that the benefits should stand.21 4 However,
in most cases, as in Randall, the statute of limitations on assessments has
already run on the relevant years2 I and it is only a matter of comparing
the tax treatment of the damages award with the tax benefits already
realized. If the tax liability arising from the damage award is equal to the
tax benefits previously recognized by the investor, the full amount of the
rescissionary damages should be paid by the defendant. In this way, the
investor will be made whole after he pays the required taxes on his damage
award. If the tax benefits previously realized by the investor exceed his
subsequent tax liability arising from the damage award, his compensation
should be adjusted downward accordingly. 216
Because the Supreme Court does not provide any clear statements on
the tax consequences of rescission damage awards under the federal secu-
rities laws, the confusion surrounding the tax treatment of such awards
still remains. 2 7 It is fairly certain that the IRS will treat the rescission as
a second independent transaction that will not change the parties' tax
210. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 938 (1982) (investor in a limited partnership oil and gas drilling venture successfully
sued an accounting firm for preparing a misleading tax opinion letter).
211. See SEC Industry Guide No. 5, Preparation of Registration Statements Relating to
Interests in Real Estate Limited Partnerships. See supra note 143.
212. See supra note 72 (statute of limitations on assessments).
213. 106 S. Ct. at 3154.
214. See Banoff, To What Extent Will Benefits From Tax Shelters Be Permitted to Offset
Rescission Damages?, 57 J. TAx'N 154, 155 (1982) ("Proof of the weaknesses of the partnership's
tax shelter benefits will be of public record in the rescission litigation, and well may serve as a
road map to the IRS on its ongoing audit."); Garahan, Should Tax Shelter Benefits Offset
Recoveries For Securities Law Violations?, 2 J. TAx'N INv. 302, 307 (1985) ("Here the investor
is clearly caught between a rock and a hard place if the taxable years in question are still open.
To reduce any offset, he must argue against the validity of his own tax return positions.").
215. Austin II, 768 F.2d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 1985) ("All of the plaintiffs' tax returns from
the relevant years have already been audited and are now closed.").
216. This payment is currently deductible by the defendant under I.R.C. § 162(0 (1982).
However, proposed Bill H.R. 2473, "Deduction Disallowance for Damages for Fraud Viola-
tions," would disallow any tax deduction for damage payments made pursuant to the convictions
for crimes involving fraud. Banoff, supra note 207, at 214.
217. See supra notes 57-60 and notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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treatment of the original sale.2"' Thus, any gain will be recognized in the
current year and will not require amending returns from prior years.2'9
However, it is uncertain whether this independent transaction will be treated
as a payment to a retiring partner,220 a sale or exchange of a partnership
interest, 221 or a recapture of all previous benefits realized under the tax
benefit rule. 222 Due to the Court's holding in Randall, neither Congress
nor the IRS has any incentive to eliminate the confusion.
The rules limiting tax shelter write-offs and the reduction in personal
income tax rates under the 1986 Tax Reform Act will likely decrease the
popularity of these tax-motivated investments. 23 Therefore, the holding in
Randall v. Loftsgaarden may have a limited impact on tax shelter securities
fraud litigation in the distant future. However, in the next few years as
fraudulent tax shelter offerings not covered by the new tax law are litigated,
the Randall doctrine will have a substantial impact on the computation of
rescissionary damages. Consequently, defendants will be in a much less
favorable bargaining position in structuring out-of-court settlements. In
addition, the Randall Court's holding encourages the lower courts to
continue the present practice of generally ignoring the tax aspects of most
civil damage awards.224
Permitting the consideration of tax benefits in the calculation of damages
in tax shelter securities fraud litigation, would allow courts to make a more
218. In Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940), a taxpayer was credited with
earnings from a corporate employee benefit fund in 1930. The plan was rescinded in 1931 as a
result of suits filed by shareholders. The court held that due to the annual accounting period
principle, the employee's taxable income for 1930 was to include the fund earnings and was to
be determined without regard to the subsequent rescission of 1931. See also Rev. Rul. 80-58,
1980-1 I.R.B. 181 (gain on sale of land made in 1978 should be recognized in 1978 even though
the property was reconveyed in 1979 pursuant to the terms of the sales contract). See generally
Banoff, supra note 91, at 970-72.
219. This is contrary to the Ninth Circuit's position in Burgess. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
220. The transaction may be treated as a payment to a retiring partner where the partnership
is still in existence and solvent. Banoff, supra note 91, at 970. The partnership is viewed as
reacquiring the partnership interest in return for the investor's cash. Id. Under I.R.C. section
736(b) (1982), payments to a retiring partner are taxable to the recipient as distributions in
liquidation of a partnership interest which may be given either capital gain or ordinary income
treatment. 2 W. McKIE, W. NELSON, & R. Wrm, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PmaTN.smsS
AND PARTXERs § 15.02[l] (1986). However, if such payments are made for unrealized receivables
or goodwill of the partnership, they are taxable to the recipient under section 736(a) either as a
distributive share of partnership income or as guaranteed payments. Id. In either case, the
retiring partner generally recognizes ordinary income. Id.
221. The payment of damages may be viewed as a sale or exchange of a partnership interest
between the defrauded investor and the defendant. Banoff, supra note 91, at 971. Therefore,
the transaction would probably be given capital gain or loss treatment under I.R.C. § 741 (1982).
Id.
222. The investor would recognize ordinary income to the extent he deducted ordinary
losses in previous years. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 27 (Tax Reform Act of 1986).
224. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
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accurate determination of the loss actually sustained by the investor. Jury
consideration of the plaintiffs' tax benefits is no more uncertain or spec-
ulative than many other determinations made by the courts. 225 Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court's holding in Randall denies courts the opportunity
to properly compensate defrauded investors in accordance with the federal
securities laws.
CONCLUSION
Randall v. Loftsgaarden holds that courts are not to consider tax benefits
realized when awarding rescissionary damages to the victims of fraudulent
tax shelters, pursuant to the federal securities laws. In doing so, the Court
read the securities statutes so as to exclude these benefits from any con-
sideration of damages. Consequently, courts are not given the opportunity
to further the goals of rescission, the form of recovery provided for by
the securities laws.
If Congress wants to deter securities fraud and insure the veracity of the
information before the investor, it should provide for a much harsher civil
penalty under the law. It is not for the courts to expand the scope of the
securities laws to conform to their perception of congressional intent.
Because of the Court's rejection of the tax benefit defense, Randall v.
Loftsgaarden does not provide any guidance as to the tax treatment of
rescissionary damages awarded under the securities laws. Therefore, Con-
gress and the IRS have no incentive to provide a much needed clarification
of the tax law in this area.
Paul J. Gaeto
225. "[T]he practical wisdom of the trial bar and the trial bench has developed effective
methods of presenting the essential elements of an expert calculation in a form that is under-
standable by juries that are familiar with the complexities of modern life. We therefore reject
the notion that the introduction of evidence describing a decedent's estimated after-tax earnings
is too speculative or complex for a jury." Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 494 (1980).
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